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If the concept of neoliberalism can seem elusive, it is not only because it has been applied to 
an enormous range of political, social, and economic phenomena, but also because it has 
been employed within a bewildering array of theoretical frameworks and consequently 
subjected to a variety of competing and sometimes incompatible definitions. As a result, 
many commentators and academics are suspicious of the term; some have even advocated 
its abandonment, on the basis that such an imprecise and promiscuous concept is too 
unwieldy and ambiguous to be of much use (e.g. Barnett, 2005; Clarke, 2008; Ferguson, 
2010; Venugopal, 2015). 
That the meaning of ‘neoliberalism’ is contested, however, hardly makes it atypical 
among political concepts. The intelligent response to disagreements and confusions over 
meaning is not to abandon the concept in question, but to evaluate alternative definitions. 
This article is intended as a contribution to such an evaluation. It will compare two 
approaches to understanding neoliberalism: a Marxist approach that defines neoliberalism 
as a class project encompassing both a set of economic policies and the ideology through 
which those policies are justified and promoted; and a Foucauldian approach that defines 
neoliberalism as a form of governmentality that installs competition and enterprise as 
regulatory norms. Although these are not the only available frameworks employed to 
analyse neoliberalism (see e.g. Birch, 2015; Flew, 2014; Davies, 2014), they are arguably the 
most common and influential. Whilst there are similarities, and even points of overlap, 
between the authors that I identify as ‘Marxist’ and ‘Foucauldian’, I contend that it is both 
analytically possible and heuristically valuable to distinguish them. At the same time, the 
significant disagreements between the two approaches do not mean that the concept of 
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neoliberalism is incoherent or that as a social form it does not really exist; nor does it mean 
that that we have to ‘pick sides’ by declaring allegiance to one interpretation over the other. 
Rather, I will argue that Marxist and Foucauldian definitions can and should be used in 
conjunction with one another to illuminate different aspects of the same phenomenon. 
 The first section of the article contrasts Marxist and Foucauldian approaches by 
offering a brief summary of their basic claims. As well as the classic interpretation by David 
Harvey (2005), I also draw on various other Marxist accounts published in the wake of the 
2008 financial crisis (especially Albo et al., 2010; Callinicos, 2010; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; 
Hall, 2011; Kotz, 2015). Rather than directly addressing Foucault’s (2008) own lectures, I will 
take as exemplary of the Foucauldian approach recent applications of his theoretical 
framework, specifically works by Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval (2013), Wendy Brown 
(2015), and Béatrice Hibou (2015). Hence, when I use the term ‘Foucauldian’ I am referring 
specifically to these writers, all of whom make use of Foucault’s concepts and arguments to 
interrogate contemporary neoliberal practices, while simultaneously going beyond Foucault 
to develop and further his insights.i The designation is not, therefore, intended to suggest 
complete fidelity to Foucault’s methodology, nor overt agreement with his findings, but 
rather to indicate work produced within parameters initially set by Foucault.ii 
The second section identifies the strengths of the Foucauldian approach, which I 
take to be their disclosure of the novelty of neoliberalism and its production of bureaucratic 
norms and entrepreneurial modes of subjectivity. In the next two sections I outline the 
weaknesses of the Foucauldian approach – primarily its tendency to present neoliberalism 
as an inescapable and monolithic ‘iron cage’ – and offer a qualified defence of Marxism, 
arguing that it is hard to make sense of neoliberalism without taking into account the 
interests which it serves. I conclude by claiming that despite significant differences between 
the two frameworks, they are nevertheless compatible, and to understand neoliberalism we 
require a Marxist-Foucauldian approach. 
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Contrasting Marxist and Foucauldian interpretations of neoliberalism 
Broadly speaking, Marxists and Foucauldians agree that ‘neoliberalism’ refers to the 
extension of the market to cover all social relations. But they disagree, first, about the 
origins and agents of neoliberal marketization. Marxists depict neoliberalism as the ruling 
class’s response to the social and economic crises of the 1970s: it began as a ‘counter-
revolution’ (Glyn, 2006: 24) or political project whose aim was to reassert the power of 
capital over labour and reverse the declining rate of profit (Harvey, 2005; Van Apeldoorn 
and Overbeek, 2012: 4; Albo et al., 2010: 27). This aim was pursued through the ending of 
the ‘class compromise’ (Harvey, 2005: 10) of the period 1945-73 and the dismantling of its 
social-democratic and Keynesian regulations and protections. Neoliberalism for Marxists 
thus entails the ‘general commercialization of social relations’ (Duménil and Lévy, 2004: 2) 
or ‘the commodification of everything’ (Harvey, 2005: 165). Its agents and beneficiaries have 
been the ruling class, especially finance capital (Duménil and Lévy, 2004), and their success 
has come at the expense of labour (Harvey, 2005: 76). 
For Foucauldians, this understanding of neoliberalism as a class project is reductively 
economistic (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 9-11). Rather than being planned and implemented by 
a sovereign subject (‘the ruling class’), neoliberalism has diffuse origins: its causes are 
complex and heterogeneous, and it is a result of a plurality of ‘intentionalities and non-
intentionalities’ (Hibou, 2015: xix). Neoliberalism is not, according to Foucauldians, a 
political project, but a form of governmentality (Dardot and Laval, 2013) or a governing 
rationality (Brown, 2015): a set of techniques for conducting the conduct of subjects (cf. 
Foucault, 2008: 186). While they accept that – as the dissemination of market values – 
neoliberalism can be understood as a form of ‘economization’, Foucauldians insist that this 
is not to be understood in narrowly economistic terms, because it does not necessarily 
involve the literal marketization or monetization of spheres of life. Brown (2015: 31, 230n33) 
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uses the example of dating: although neoliberalism encourages us to understand and 
conduct our love lives in economic terms – investing time and energy in the hope of a 
return, increasing our efficiency and productivity through dating apps, ‘outsourcing’ the 
search for love to matchmaking websites, and so forth – the aim of this conduct is not 
literally to make a monetary profit. Neoliberalism involves the imposition of market norms 
rather than the submission of all activity to the profit motive, and so cannot be seen simply 
as serving the economic interests of the bourgeoisie. 
Second, there is disagreement between the two approaches over the role of the 
neoliberal state. The focus of Marxist analyses of neoliberalism tends to be on policies which 
involved the withdrawal of the state: deregulation of the financial sector and of consumer 
and employment protections, retreat of government intervention through privatisations, 
cutting taxes and welfare, removal of barriers to free trade and the international mobility of 
capital (cf. Glyn, 2006; Kotz, 2015). Nonetheless, most Marxists insist that the neoliberal 
rhetoric of the minimal state is ultimately obfuscatory, serving to mask neoliberalism’s 
dependence upon the state (to establish and regulate markets, bail out banks, crush dissent, 
etc.) (e.g. Harvey, 2005: 70-81; Albo et al., 2010: 35). They argue that the macroeconomic 
management of postwar social democracy has not been abandoned so much as 
reconfigured towards different ends (Callinicos, 2010: 69; cf. Duménil and Lévy, 2011: 88). 
For Foucauldians, however, this recognition of the interventionist nature of the 
neoliberal state does not go far enough: it simply restates the Marxist belief that capital 
needs the state to defend and augment its interests, and does not recognise the radical 
transformation of the state wrought by neoliberalism. This transformation, Foucauldians 
argue, is in part based on neoliberalism’s novel understanding of the market. For classical 
liberalism, the market was a spontaneously occurring sphere of exchange between equal 
individuals, rooted in the human ‘propensity to truck, barter, and exchange’ (Smith, 1976: 
25): consequently, the role of the state was to let the market function and to compensate 
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for its deficiencies or pernicious effects (e.g. by providing education). In contrast, for 
neoliberals the market is necessarily constructed and its essence is not exchange between 
individuals but competition between enterprises, premised upon and productive of 
inequality (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 301; Brown, 2015: 62-66; cf. Foucault, 2008: 118). 
Because competition is not ‘a primitive and natural given’, the state must constantly 
intervene in order to establish and guarantee the conditions of competition – to construct 
what is not given by nature (Foucault, 2008: 131). Hence, for neoliberalism the ideal is not 
the minimal state but the entrepreneurial state: the market is the principle ‘not of the state’s 
limitation, but of its internal regulation from start to finish of its existence and action’ 
(Foucault, 2008: 116; cf. Dardot and Laval, 2013: 16-18). This means that the state has 
legitimacy only insofar as it promotes and protects market competition, but also that the 
state is itself submitted to market criteria (Brown, 2015: 63-64; cf. Foucault, 2008: 246-7).  
There is a marketization of the state, with the state viewed as one enterprise among many 
(Dardot and Laval, 2013: 216-8). State functions are not necessarily privatised, but must be 
performed according to the norms of private enterprise: policies and their execution are 
judged according to whether or not they are cost-effective, efficient, productive, etc. 
Because the efficiency of government activities and institutions must be monitored, there is 
a ‘bureaucratic inflation’ of regulatory bodies whose task is to audit and evaluate 
performance through the use of targets, objectives, metrics, etc. (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 
250; Hibou, 2015). 
Finally, there is disagreement about the role and status of neoliberal discourse. For 
Marxists, neoliberal theory is pure ideology: it reflects and justifies, rather than motivates or 
shapes, neoliberal practice. Its rhetoric of individual freedom and autonomy merely 
disguises the reality of class domination. This does not mean, however, that neoliberal 
theory is superfluous or disposable, for it is argued that it plays an important role in 
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constructing neoliberalism as common sense and hence winning support for and consent to 
the neoliberal project (Hall, 2011; Harvey, 2005: 39-63; Van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012). 
For Foucauldians, in contrast, the neoliberal discourse of freedom, choice, individual 
responsibility, etc. is constitutive rather than illusory: neoliberalism governs through and on 
the basis of individual freedom. In place of the direct subjugation or domination of subjects, 
it constitutes entrepreneurial subjects who are afforded the freedom to act in accordance 
with the rationality of the market. ‘Neoliberal subjects are controlled through their freedom’ 
(Brown, 2005: 44). This is ‘government at a distance’: individuals are given personal 
responsibility, but only on the basis that they engage in a self-monitoring of their action 
within a framework of particular rules and norms (Hibou, 2015: 68). Because the ‘rational’ 
functioning of the market and its actors is not assured by nature, appropriate types of 
thinking and behaviour must be induced. This is why there is an inflation of bureaucracy 
under neoliberalism: processes, institutions, and actors must be monitored, audited, 
evaluated, and certified, to ensure that they are efficient, cost-effective, transparent, and 
accountable and that the market operates as it should. If people accede to neoliberalism, 
therefore, it is not because they are deceived by a set of ideas that conceal reality, but 
because in their everyday practices they actively participate in and recreate neoliberal 
techniques of governing. Hence our analysis should focus not on policies or ideas that are 
imposed from above, but on the attitudes and practices that make up what Philip Mirowski 
(2014: 92) – some of whose arguments resonate with those of the Foucauldian critics here 
under consideration – calls ‘everyday neoliberalism’.iii 
 
Advantages of the Foucauldian approach 
The Foucauldian writers cited above are all in different ways and to differing degrees critical 
of Foucault (e.g. Brown, 2015: 73-111; Hibou, 2015: 16-17). But they can all reasonably be 
named ‘Foucauldian’ on the basis that their analyses of neoliberalism all follow Foucault in: 
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shifting the focus of study from the state to technologies of government; insisting that those 
technologies of government be understood in terms of their underlying rationality; and 
emphasising the novelty of neoliberal rationality, centred around the figure of the 
enterprise. Hence, while not all of these authors would call themselves Foucauldian – and 
might even reject that label – none of their analyses would have been possible without The 
Birth of Biopolitics: they are ‘Foucauldian’ not because they agree with everything Foucault 
said or merely repeat his claims, but because they seize on and put to work the central and 
distinctive insights of his work on neoliberalism. 
Perhaps above all, they are distinctively Foucauldian in the sense that they share a 
common critique of the Marxist approach to neoliberalism. This is true even of Brown, who 
acknowledges the significance of Marx’s analysis of capitalism to understanding 
neoliberalism while nonetheless using Foucault to highlight Marxism’s inability to grasp 
neoliberalism’s singular characteristics (e.g. Brown, 2005: 45). Indeed, the Foucauldian 
critique can be summarised by saying that they argue that Marxism underplays the novelty 
of neoliberalism. This is in many respects a legitimate and convincing claim. Various Marxists 
have framed neoliberalism as the re-emergence of ‘an old form of capitalism’, characterised 
by the return of market forces, the restoration of ruling class power, the reassertion of the 
hegemony of finance capital, and a resurgence of income inequality (Kotz, 2015: 46; Duménil 
and Lévy, 2004; Glyn, 2006). For Foucauldians, this emphasis on continuity and repetition 
underestimates the way in which neoliberalism, as a political rationality, develops and 
implements a specific and innovative conception of the market and of the role of the state in 
relation to the market. 
As Foucault (2007: 109) himself has suggested, by reducing the state to the function 
of reproducing capitalist relations of production, Marxism tends ironically to inflate its 
importance: it ‘makes the state absolutely essential as the target to be attacked’. In contrast, 
the concept of governmentality allows Foucauldians to separate ‘government’ from ‘the 
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state’, and in doing so to stress the originality of neoliberalism. They can show that the 
retreat of the state under neoliberalism is real, and not (pace Marxism) an ideological 
smokescreen, but that this retreat has been accompanied by an explosion of techniques of 
government. To reverse a formulation from Foucault (2008: 102), neoliberalism gives us 
more government with less state. The state has withdrawn from the direct provision of 
goods and services but only by establishing markets which require constant intervention and 
governance to function. While individuals are given freedom and responsibility for their 
choices, those free individuals must be guided and induced to act in ‘rational’ ways. Because 
markets are constructed rather than natural, market rationality must be imposed. This is 
why there is an increase in governmental bureaucracy: it is through various forms of 
auditing, monitoring, and ranking that the ‘rational’ and efficient functioning of the market 
is assessed and assured and individuals are encouraged or constrained to act as rational 
economic actors. What results is neither simply privatization and the shrinking of the state 
nor the continued state provision of services by public servants. What we see is a 
‘hybridization between public and private’ in which ‘the borders between public and private, 
and the very meaning of these two notions, are muddled’ (Hibou, 2015: 62, 40). 
Foucault and his successors thus move beyond or beneath the state to examine 
techniques of government, arguing that these techniques infiltrate all institutions of society: 
there is an ‘increasing ubiquity of market and business norms’, entailing a ‘neoliberal 
bureaucratization of everyday life’ (Hibou, 2015: 11, 9). Moreover, the norms and rules 
through which neoliberalism governs are not so much enforced from above (by the state or 
by transnational institutions) as embraced from below. Whereas Marxist analyses of 
neoliberalism focus on loss or destruction (of social solidarities, collective rights, regulations, 
ways of life, and so on), the Foucauldian analysis focuses on the everyday practices through 
which neoliberalism produces subjects who willingly adopt neoliberal norms. 
 9 
Foucauldians have thus developed what we might call a microphysics of neoliberal 
power that allows us to trace how neoliberal norms are internalised and enacted, and hence 
how neoliberalism is sustained and reproduced. This type of analysis is enabled not only by 
moving beyond the state but also by thinking about what is new in neoliberalism’s concept 
of the market. Foucauldians convincingly argue that rather than simply extending market 
relations (‘the commodification of everything’), neoliberalism redefines the market, now 
understood in terms of competition between enterprises rather than exchange between 
individuals: everything, including and especially human beings, is conceived of as an 
enterprise. Neoliberalism’s homo economicus is not the utility maximiser of classical 
liberalism, but an entrepreneurial self: a unit of human capital whose purpose is to invest in 
himself in order to increase his value and position himself better in the competitive market 
(Brown, 2015: 80-87; Dardot and Laval, 2013: 107; cf. Foucault, 2008: 147). By focusing in 
particular on the individual as entrepreneur and the reconfiguration of the human as human 
capital, Foucauldians are able to offer an analysis of the quotidian operation of neoliberalism 
that is far more finely grained and subtle than the Marxist analysis. 
Moreover, they can provide a more convincing account of the resilience of 
neoliberalism. As we have seen, Marxists explain neoliberalism’s persistence at least in part 
by resorting to the Gramscian category of consent, focusing on the construction of 
neoliberalism as common sense. Yet, especially in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, 
neoliberal ‘common sense’ has been widely challenged and even rejected. Rather than 
asking how neoliberal ideology aids and advances neoliberal policies, today we must ask why 
it is that neoliberalism endures even when neoliberal ideology is increasingly viewed as 
bankrupt. The Foucauldian response is that by looking at bottom-up practices rather than 
ideas circulated from above then it can be seen that a person may be suspicious of, even 
hostile towards, neoliberalism while nonetheless actively adopting neoliberal behaviours. 
Indeed, resistance to neoliberalism can unwittingly take neoliberal forms, as when 
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protestors and activists rely on technologies like Twitter and Facebook (which encourage the 
individual to become her own ‘brand’) (cf. Mirowski, 2014: 328). In this and many other 
ways, neoliberalism ‘can be intensified by actions that are directly aimed against it’ (Hibou, 
2015: xviii). 
 
Weaknesses of the Foucauldian approach 
By bringing to light the conception of the entrepreneurial self and its constitution through 
everyday practices, Foucauldians offer a compelling account not only of neoliberalism’s 
novelty but also of its tenacity and endurance. A central weakness of their work, however, is 
that they apparently cannot see beyond this tenacity: there is a tendency in Foucauldian 
analyses to present neoliberal subjectivization as always successful, such that the self 
becomes nothing more than the effect of neoliberal strategies and practices. This strong 
strain of Weberian pessimism is explicit in the metaphor of the ‘iron cage’ that Dardot and 
Laval (2013: 262) use to describe neoliberal subjectivity (cf. Hibou, 2015: 86; Brown, 2015: 
111). Even the opposition and resistance that do exist, it is argued, often inadvertently 
reinforce neoliberalism and its bureaucracy (Hibou, 2015: 119). 
 The cynicism of Foucauldian analyses may seem surprising because, on the face of it, 
it is in sharp contrast to what Foucault himself offers. Although claims that Foucault was a 
closet neoliberal are ultimately unconvincing, his analysis in The Birth of Biopolitics is 
notoriously non-judgemental, and in no way does he pose neoliberalism as an inescapable 
threat or danger.iv Moreover, the concept of governmentality with which neoliberalism is 
analysed by Foucault – and which is then taken up by his successors – seems in part 
designed to preclude the kind of hopelessness that we find in recent applications of his 
work. As many of its first interpreters argued, ‘governmentality’ can be understood as 
moderating Foucault’s earlier notion of disciplinary power, which was plausibly criticised for 
implying that the subject is wholly determined by an all-embracing form of domination. In 
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contrast, because it presupposes individual freedom, governmentality suggests a capacity to 
resist or avoid domination, ‘loosening… the connection between subjectification and 
subjection’ (Burchell, 1996: 20; cf. Gordon, 1991: 4-5; McNay, 1994). 
Yet for Foucauldian analysts of neoliberalism it is precisely because neoliberal 
governmentality presupposes and operates through individual autonomy that it is so 
dominant. The ‘freedom to choose’ which it accords to individuals is real, but it is conditional 
on engaging in competitive behaviour and accepting the market as the only ‘rules of the 
game’ (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 170). Because neoliberalism relies on self-government, its 
market norms and the entrepreneurial spirit are not imposed from above or outside but are 
voluntarily internalised and even actively embraced. This is ‘a domination that is all the more 
powerful for being invisible’, ‘exercised to a great extent without people realizing it, through 
self-control and the interiorization of norms’ (Hibou, 2015 p. 91). 
Their conceptualization of neoliberalism is similar to Foucault’s conceptualization of 
power: not emanating from a single source (such as the power of the bourgeoisie), it is 
omnipresent, permeating all social relations. But whereas in his discussions of power 
Foucault (1979: 92) explicitly rules out ‘the over-all unity of a domination’, for Foucauldians 
neoliberalism entails that the ‘same normative logic’ governs all levels of society, giving it 
‘the incomparable advantage of linking all power relations in the framework of a single 
discourse’ (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 5, 263). 
This approach not only depicts neoliberalism as totalizing and inescapable, it also 
places a very strong emphasis on the rupture with the past that neoliberalism introduces. 
Dardot and Laval (2013: 304, 305) argue that by replacing the figure of the citizen as a 
bearer of political rights with the figure of entrepreneurial man, ‘the whole of citizenship as 
construed in western countries since the eighteenth century is called into question at its 
very roots’, such that neoliberalism ‘heralds a new phase in the history of Western 
societies’. Brown (2015: 87-99) goes further, arguing that neoliberalism destroys a notion of 
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homo politicus that dates back to at least Aristotle. In increasingly heightened language, 
Brown (2015: 99, 222, 188) thus claims that neoliberalism is ‘revolutionary’, a ‘civilizational 
turning point’, and risks ushering in the moment when ‘humanity will have entered its 
darkest chapter ever’. 
There is no question of ‘blaming’ Foucault for the pessimism and hyperbole of those 
who have used his work to analyse neoliberalism. But I think it can nonetheless be said that 
Foucauldians have extrapolated from tendencies and arguments in Foucault’s own work, 
specifically: his conceptualization of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality that 
operates by multiplying rather than restricting freedoms; his understanding of power as 
ubiquitous; and his emphasis on discontinuity and rupture. In Foucauldian analyses of 
neoliberalism these themes are translated into a theory of neoliberalism as: a form of 
governmentality that undercuts all potential resistance by basing itself on the very 
autonomy that would be the source of such resistance; a form of power that is all-pervasive 
and monolithic; and a turning point in human history that is without precedent. 
Consequently, what is emphasised in these analyses is the extreme difficulty and 
improbability of opposing neoliberalism. 
In Foucauldian analyses, neoliberalism thus becomes a total, all-encompassing, and 
virtually uncontested form of domination, as if the neoliberal fantasy of the economization 
of all social life has actually been realised – as if the real world is indistinguishable from that 
found in the pages of a Gary Becker book. Some critics have explicitly claimed that Foucault 
himself is at fault here. Lois McNay (2009: 69), for instance, argues that ‘Foucault does not 
distinguish sufficiently between neoliberalism as a theory which is intellectually hegemonic 
and a practice of governance which is never assured or complete’. But this is unfair to 
Foucault, who was writing at a time when neoliberalism ‘in practice’ was only in its nascent 
stages and so could have done little other than provide an exegesis of neoliberal texts. At 
the start of The Birth of Biopolitics he makes clear that his object of study is not practices of 
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government but the ‘rationalization of governmental practice’ or ‘government’s 
consciousness of itself’ (Foucault, 2008: 2). We should also bear in mind that The Birth of 
Biopolitics is a lecture series and hence a provisional outline rather than a completed 
project. Given Foucault’s justifiable focus on theoretical writings, one of the ways in which 
Foucauldians distinguish their own analyses is by turning their attention to neoliberal 
practices. While this is a legitimate and laudable aim, however, it is pursued as if those 
practices are the seamless realisation of neoliberal reason. 
 
Revisiting Marxism 
Conceiving of neoliberalism as a governing rationality certainly has its advantages: it allows 
Foucauldians to view neoliberal reason as constitutive rather than simply as a set of ideas 
which are reflective of, or which are used to disguise, pre-existing practices. But it also leads 
them to overstate the coherence and uniformity of neoliberal reason and the ease and 
success with which it has been implemented and realised. Conversely, although Marxists 
tend to be blind to the specific novelty of neoliberal rationality and its constitutive role, their 
conception of neoliberalism as a set of economic policies and its ideology helps challenge 
the apparent invincibility of neoliberalism. Somewhat ironically, given Foucauldian 
accusations of the reductiveness of Marxism, Marxists have been far more attentive to the 
complex and uneven development of neoliberalism and the diverse forms and paths which it 
has taken. Rather than seeing neoliberalism as a successfully realized form of reason, 
Marxists have argued that neoliberalism is articulated in ambiguous and diverse ways: there 
are contradictions and tensions within and between neoliberal theory and practice (cf. Hall, 
2011: 713; Harvey, 2005: 64-81). As such, although neoliberalism is dominant, it is more 
unstable and fragile than Foucauldians allow. This instability arises in part from the specific 
policies that neoliberalism advances: in its pursuit of profits and high incomes at the 
expense of investment, it is increasingly reliant on debt, bubbles, and complex and risky 
 14 
financial innovations and hence is highly volatile and prone to crises (Duménil and Lévy, 
2011: 22-25; Callinicos, 2010: 50-83). 
 Conceptualizing neoliberalism as a project that serves the interests of a certain 
social group – namely the ruling class, especially finance capital – further allows Marxists to 
stress the opposition that neoliberalism faces from other social groups and hence the 
setbacks and reversals to which it is subject. In contrast to the Foucauldian tendency to 
frame neoliberalism as monolithic and totalizing, Marxists present neoliberalism as a process 
(Hall, 2011: 727) or a ‘project in motion, continuously contested, a process of countless 
rounds of struggles and negotiations with oppositional forces’ (Van Apeldoorn and 
Overbeek, 2012: 6). Although there are Foucauldians who emphasise the ambiguous, 
indeterminate, and contested nature of neoliberalism (cf. Hibou, 2015), this stress on the 
polyvalence and heterogeneity of neoliberal discourses and techniques tends to obscure the 
actual power dynamics at operation within neoliberalism and the sharp divisions it has 
produced and exacerbated. What is foregrounded by Foucauldians is our mutual complicity 
in neoliberalism and consequently our equal ability to engage in practices of micro-
resistance. But this is to downplay the highly asymmetric nature of neoliberal power 
relations and their differential and polarizing effects. 
Presenting neoliberalism as a form of political rationality not only marginalises 
analysis of the distributive effects of neoliberalism, it is also one-sided. It is at best partial to 
claim, as Foucauldians do, that neoliberalism requires the imposition of market rationality 
but not necessarily the imposition of markets as such. To return to an earlier example: we 
saw that Brown claims that while we are called upon to think of sexual relationships in 
economic terms, we are not literally required to monetize our love lives – hence 
economization does not equal monetization. But Brown’s example undermines her own 
point, because the world of dating obviously is highly monetized: it is a multi-billion dollar 
global industry and we are encouraged to think of our love lives in economic terms by the 
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various dating companies, websites, and apps whose aim is precisely to make a monetary 
profit. In other words, the expansion of neoliberal rationality into the realms of sex and love 
serves a higher end, namely that of profitability. 
 It may be that Brown’s example is simply poorly chosen, but it is hard to think of any 
instance of the imposition of market rationality that does not have increased profitability as 
its ultimate goal. This does not mean that the Foucauldian approach is irrelevant: to the 
contrary, it is extremely valuable for analysing the specific modes of reason and subjectivity 
that marketization involves. But the analysis will be incomplete if it does not acknowledge 
that marketization produces a certain distribution of wealth that benefits particular 
economic interests. 
 
A Marxist-Foucauldian approach 
Unless we recognise that particular interests have been served by neoliberalism, it is hard to 
see why it has been a specifically neoliberal mode of reason that has triumphed. 
Foucauldians, as we have seen, account for the success of neoliberalism by pointing to our 
complicity or active participation: through their free choices, neoliberal subjects govern 
themselves in accordance with the rationality of the market. But why the specifically 
economic rationality of the market? Why not some other form of rationality? For Marxists, 
the answer is relatively straightforward: it is because, ultimately, it serves the interests of 
capital. As Duménil & Lévy (2004: 128-139) ask: ‘Who benefits from the crime?’ Their 
answer is that ‘[f]inance benefitted’, and so we must see finance capital as the architect and 
agent of neoliberalism. For Foucauldians, this is likely to appear too teleological, for it 
implies that one of the results of neoliberalism (increased wealth and power for capital) can 
explain the whole phenomenon, as if neoliberalism was carefully planned by a conscious 
agent with clear goals in mind. It is for this reason that Dardot and Laval (2013: 8) argue that 
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Duménil & Lévy’s question – ‘Who benefits from the crime?’ – is poorly put: it reflects ‘a 
recurrent fallacy, which consists in identifying the beneficiary of a crime with its author’. 
Yet Duménil & Lévy (2004: 212) are more subtle than Dardot and Laval allow: they 
explicitly state that the question of the results and beneficiaries of neoliberalism is not 
identical to the question of how exactly we arrived at neoliberalism, claiming that 
‘[n]eoliberalism has developed as the product of a whole range of processes’. In other 
words, conceptualising neoliberalism as a political project that benefits the ruling class does 
not necessarily mean viewing it as the product of a conspiracy or perfectly executed plan. As 
Harvey (2005: 13) has put it, ‘[t]he capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalization… 
through a series of gyrations and chaotic experiments’. It is possible to acknowledge the 
multifaceted origins of neoliberal techniques whilst nonetheless simultaneously recognising 
that those techniques and policies have been adopted by a particular class and used for their 
own ends. Indeed, something like this approach has been used by Foucault (1980: 101) 
himself, who in various contexts has shown how different discourses, apparatuses of power, 
and disciplinary techniques have been adopted by the bourgeoisie and put to ‘economically 
advantageous and politically useful’ ends. 
In short, rather than viewing the Marxist and Foucauldian approaches to 
neoliberalism as incompatible alternatives (cf. Flew, 2012, 2014; Barnett, 2005), I am 
suggesting that they can complement and reinforce each other. What Marxism lacks – and 
what Foucauldians provide – is an understanding of the specificity of neoliberal subject 
positions and their constitution through everyday (often bureaucratic) practices. Conversely, 
Foucauldians are blind to the specific interests that benefit from neoliberalism, without 
acknowledgement of which it is hard to make sense of the dominant trends of the past 40 
years.v 
Neoliberalism is not merely the revival of laissez-faire or an old form of capitalism – 
but it is still a form of capitalism, and cannot be understood outside of any analysis of the 
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history and dynamics of capitalist accumulation. Neoliberalism is not simply destructive, and 
is rather productive of modes of life and subjectivity – but it is not exhaustive of all possible 
modes and it does face (sometimes successful) opposition. Neoliberalism is neither 
monocausal nor the result of a conspiracy – but it has been aggressively pursued by those 
whom it benefits. Bringing together the Marxist and Foucauldian approaches allows us to 
analyse both the broader class dimensions of neoliberalism and its operation on the ground: 
to understand that ‘neoliberalism equally involves the economy and subjectivity, “work” and 
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i In this sense, they differ from much of the recent work on Foucault and neoliberalism, 
which has tended to restrict itself to textual commentary on and interpretation of The Birth 
of Biopolitics or to debates over Foucault’s own relationship to neoliberalism. 
ii Given the ways in which I have circumscribed the ‘Marxist’ and ‘Foucauldian’ approaches, I 
am not going to engage directly with a similar debate that has recently taken place within 
and across the disciplines of anthropology, geography, and urban studies. On one side of this 
debate have been those, informed by Marxist and neo-Marxist theories, who advocate a 
‘structuralist’ or ‘systemic’ approach (e.g. Peck and Tickell, 2002; Jessop, 2013) or who 
explore the role of neoliberal thinktanks as ‘organic intellectuals’ whose ideas are 
constructed and operate within particular conjunctural conditions (e.g. Peck, 2010). On the 
other side are those who support a ‘governmentality’ approach inspired by Foucault (e.g. 
Ong, 2006; Collier, 2012). Also contributing to the debate are those searching (in different 
ways) for a ‘third way’ (e.g. Hilgers, 2013; Wacquant, 2012; Larner, 2000; Springer, 2012) 
and those who question the efficacy or utility of ‘neoliberalism’ as a critical concept. This 
debate has generated some genuine insights – the most sophisticated contribution is that of 
Brenner et al. (2010) – but the positions taken are not those which I analyse in this article. 
Although the ‘structuralist’ side emphasise the global dominance or hegemony of 
neoliberalism as well as its uneven and contradictory development, they downplay or ignore 
the central feature of the Marxist approach that I analyse, namely the claim that 
neoliberalism is a class project. The ‘governmentality’ side, on the other hand, has a 
sometimes loose relation to Foucault’s work, instead resorting to generic poststructuralist 
themes of fluidity, mobility, complexity, hybridity, and indeterminacy. 
iii Although Mirowski’s attempts at ‘teasing out the operation of [neoliberal] power on the 
ground and under the skin’ (Mirowski, 2014: 97) resonate with Foucauldian analyses – in 
that he views neoliberalism in non-Marxist terms as a state-led project that reconfigures the 
market and constitutes new (entrepreneurial) subjects – he is much more critical of Foucault 
than the other thinkers considered here, and hence I do not here categorise him as a 
‘Foucauldian’. 
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iv See Dean (2015) and Gordon (2015) for convincing critiques of the claim that Foucault 
himself was some kind of neoliberal. 
v There are of course different ways in which Marxist and Foucauldian approaches might be 
combined. Indeed, notwithstanding her broadly Foucauldian framework – and the 
associated weaknesses identified above – Wendy Brown herself calls for something like a 
Marxist-Foucauldian approach. She does so, however, by suggesting that Foucault might be 
‘welded’ to the analysis of capitalism offered by Marx rather than the analyses of 
neoliberalism offered by Marxists (and which she rather contrasts unfavourably with 
Foucault): as such, she has little to say about the key elements of the Marxist analyses of 
neoliberalism that I wish to foreground in my own synthesis of Marxism and Foucault, in 
particular its class dimension (Brown, 2015: 77). 
